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LIST OF PARTIES 
T. Mark Wolsey and Melissa Wolsey are plaintiffs/ 
appellants. Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems is defendant/ 
appellee. 
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. was a party in the district 
court, but is not a party to this appeal, notwithstanding the 
fact that no final disposition of plaintiffs7 claims against 
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. has been made. 
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VI 
JURISDICTION 
This court does not have jurisdiction because a final 
judgment disposing of all claims has not been entered by the 
district court. Additionally, this matter was not certified 
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by the 
district court. 
Since a final judgment has not been entered disposing of 
all claims against all parties, § 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code 
and § 78-2a-3(2) (k) of the Utah Code do not confer jurisdiction 
on the Utah Supreme Court or this Court. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Although plaintiffs vigorously contested the applicability 
of ERISA preemption in the trial court, plaintiffs have 
conceded on appeal that ERISA preemption does apply. There-
fore, the issue before the court is not the applicability of 
ERISA, but is instead the propriety of the court's judgment of 
dismissal with prejudice, and this court's jurisdiction, if 
any, to hear this appeal. Specifically, the issues on appeal 
are as follows: 
1. Since a final judgment disposing of plaintiffs' 
claims against all parties has not been entered, and since the 
trial court made no determination under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, does this Court have jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal, or must the appeal be dismissed? 
2. Have plaintiffs raised new claims that cannot be 
addressed on appeal? 
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3. Was the judgment of dismissal with prejudice entered 
by the trial court in favor of defendant Intercare Benefit 
Systems (Intercare) and against plaintiffs proper? 
These are legal determinations for which the trial court's 
decision is accorded no particular deference, but rather is 
reviewed for correctness. See Buchanan v. Hansen, 82 0 P. 2d 908 
(Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
3. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Plaintiffs filed a civil action 
seeking to recover damages for alleged breach of an employee 
medical benefit plan. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiffs 
filed suit against Intercare to recover medical expenses 
allegedly owing under an employee benefit plan, damages for 
emotional distress, and punitive damages. (R. 12). Defendant 
answered by stating that, among other things, plaintiffs' 
claims were preempted by ERISA. (R. 18) . On January 14, 1992, 
plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add Pro-Benefit 
Staffing, Inc. (Pro-Benefit) as an additional named defendant 
and to add additional common law claims. (R. 23). The court 
granted the motion to amend on February 18, 1992. (R. 176). 
2 
Defendant Intercare moved for summary judgment on January 
22, 1992, The basis for the motion was that the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1001-1461 preempted all claims asserted by plaintiffs in 
their complaint and amended complaint. (R. 44, 52). 
Plaintiffs responded to Intercare's motion for summary 
judgment on February 11, 1992. Plaintiffs argued ERISA did not 
apply because T. Mark Wolsey (Wolsey) was not an employee of 
Pro-Benefit, and that no employer-employee relationship was 
ever entered into between Wolsey and Pro-Benefit. (R. 166, 
170) . 
In response to the arguments raised by plaintiffs, 
Intercare filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 185). Intercare argued that the plain-
tiffs' lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice because as a 
matter of law if Wolsey was not an employee of Pro-Benefit as 
plaintiff contended, plaintiffs were entitled to no benefits 
under the medical benefit plan established by Pro-Benefit. 
Oral argument on Intercare's motion took place before the 
trial court on June 19, 1992. Intercare, through counsel, 
again requested that plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice. (R. 250-267). The court took the matter under 
advisement. (R. 200). Subsequently, on July 7, 1992, the 
court entered its ruling. (R. 201). This ruling was 
formalized when Judge Christensen entered a formal judgment on 
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September 9, 1992, dismissing plaintiffs7 amended complaint 
against Intercare with prejudice, (R. 207). 
On September 18, 1992, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend 
the judgment, asking that the dismissal be without prejudice. 
(R. 219). The motion was briefed by both sides. On October 
15, 1992, the court issued a ruling denying the motion. (R. 
240). This ruling was formalized by an order signed by Judge 
Christensen on November 3, 1992. (R. 242). 
During the time the foregoing was taking place, plaintiffs 
sought and were granted leave of court to serve defendant Pro-
Benefit by publication. (R. 188-192). Service by publication 
was effected, and on September 15, 1992, Judge Christensen 
signed a default certificate. (R. 216, 217). However, no judg-
ment or order of any kind was ever entered by the trial court 
in favor of plaintiffs and against Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. 
On November 10, 1992, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal 
wherein they purported to appeal the final judgment entered by 
Judge Christensen on September 9, 1992. (R. 246). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Facts Pertaining to Intercare Benefit Systems. 
1. In September of 1991, plaintiffs, T. Mark Wolsey and 
Melissa Wolsey, filed a complaint against Intercare. The 
complaint alleged that plaintiffs were entitled to medical 
benefits under a medical benefit plan for medical expenses 
Wolsey had incurred incident to medical treatment his daughter, 
Melissa, had received after an accident. Plaintiffs also 
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sought punitive damages and damages for alleged emotional 
distress. (R. 12). 
2. Defendant Intercare answered the complaint by 
asserting that, among other things, plaintiffs' claims were 
preempted by ERISA. (R. 21, see Fourth Defense). 
3. On January 22, 1992, Intercare filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the basis of ERISA preemption. (R. 44). 
Intercare supported its motion with a memorandum of points and 
authorities and an affidavit from James Beardall (Beardall), 
President of Intercare. (R. 52, 109). Neither in the affidav-
it nor motion did Intercare specify whether the dismissal 
should be with or without prejudice. It simply asked for a 
dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint and proposed amended 
complaint. 
4. Beardall's affidavit in support of Intercare's motion 
for summary judgment set forth several facts which were never 
disputed. Based upon the undisputed affidavit, it is clear 
that Intercare was not, and had never acted as an insurance 
company, it had never at any time insured plaintiffs, and it 
had never entered into any contracts with plaintiffs. The role 
of Intercare was simply to serve as the contract claims proces-
sor for Pro-Benefit's employee medical benefit plan. Pro-
Benefit was itself the administrator of the plan. (R. 107-
109) . 
5. On February 11, 1992, plaintiffs filed a memorandum 
in opposition to Intercare's motion for summary judgment. (R. 
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166). Plaintiffs argued that ERISA did not apply as a bar to 
plaintiffs7 complaint because Wolsey was not an employee of 
Pro-Benefitf and accordingly, ERISA preemption was inappli-
cable. Plaintiffs made this point repeatedly in their 
memorandum in opposition to defendant Intercare/s motion for 
summary judgment. Examples follow: 
In the statement of facts portion of their memorandum, 
plaintiffs flatly state: "Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. was not 
the employer of T. Mark Wolsey. See Affidavit of T. Mark 
Wolsey." Plaintiffs then went on to say that Pro-Benefit did 
not hire Wolsey, or sponsor an employee benefit plan. (R. 166-
165) . 
Under Point II of their argument, plaintiffs represented 
to the trial court: 
T. Mark Wolsey states in his affidavit 
that Pro-Benefit was not his employer and 
describes the relationship. The relation-
ship had none of the characteristics of an 
employer/employee relationship even though 
Pro-Benefit held itself out as an employ-
er. . . . In the instant case plaintiff 
has pointed to conduct that shows the 
agreement in the instant case was a sham 
and subterfuge to conceal the true rela-
tionship between the parties. . . . Pro-
Benefit exercised no control whatsoever 
over T. Mark Wolsey and did not pay him a 
wage or salary but merely returned to him 
an amount given to it by him for his 
salary as part of the agreement. The 
agreement was merely a facade to help Pro-
Benefit appear to be an employer. (R. 
163) . 
Under Point III of their memorandum, plaintiffs state: 
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Defendant Intercare is not entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Pro-Benefit 
is not an employer and therefore the ERISA 
statute does not apply. . . . Plaintiff 
claims that Pro-Benefit is not an employer 
and that the insurance policy issued to 
plaintiff was not an employee benefit 
plan. (R. 162). 
Plaintiffs concluded Point III of their memorandum by 
again reiterating: 
Pro-Benefit was not plaintiffs employer 
and their insurance policy was not an 
employee benefit plan. Pro-Benefit's 
attempt to hold themselves out as an 
employer was merely a facade for their 
insurance company activities. Therefore 
plaintiff's state claims are not barred by 
ERISA. (R. 161). 
6. On February 2 6, 1992, defendant Intercare filed a 
reply memorandum. (R. 185). Intercare argued the case should 
be dismissed due to ERISA preemption. Intercare also argued 
additional points in light of plaintiff's sworn affidavit. 
Intercare argued the case should be dismissed because the plan 
did not cover plaintiffs and because the doctrines of waiver 
and estoppel precluded plaintiff's claims. In its reply 
memorandum, Intercare wrote: 
If Plaintiff denies that he is or 
ever was an employee of Pro-Benefit, then 
he was never eligible for participation in 
the Plan, and is not currently eligible 
for any benefit payments. Accordingly, 
under the clear terms of the Plan and its 
contract with Pro-Benefit, Intercare would 
be required to deny payment of the claims 
in question. If, as Plaintiff claims, he 
is not an employee, then he is not 
entitled to Plan benefits, and his lawsuit 
must be dismissed. (R. 180). 
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* * * * 
Plaintiff seeks to declare that he is not 
an employee of Pro-Benefit. If this is in 
fact the case, then he should never have 
been enrolled in the Plan, and is ineligi-
ble for benefits, and his claims must be 
denied as a matter of law. (R. 179). 
* * * * 
Plaintiff never asserts that he was not 
aware of the fact that he was enrolling in 
an employee benefit plan. Characterized 
as favorably as possible, his affidavit 
asserts that he entered into a conspiracy 
to defraud the Plan by allowing a non-
employee to be enrolled. He knew what he 
was about and did it consciously. He now 
seeks to obtain judgment under state law 
against the only party in the case with no 
role in the fraud. This action should be 
dismissed for the reasons herein stated. 
(R. 178). 
7. On June 19, 1992, oral argument took place on 
Intercare's motion for summary judgment. At that time 
plaintiffs' counsel continued to maintain that Wolsey was not 
an employee of Pro-Benefit, and there was no employee benefit 
plan. For example, plaintiffs7 counsel stated: 
What I'm here to argue today is that there 
was not an employee benefit plan. And 
also, as opposing counsel has offered his 
argument, I also move for summary judgment 
based upon that there are no material 
issues of fact as to whether or not 
there's an employee benefit plan. The 
facts that we have set out in this case by 
affidavit of the plaintiff, Mark Wolsey, 
is that Pro Benefit did not supervise his 
work. They did not direct his work. They 
did not direct the work of its employees. 
They did not act in any way as an 
employer. (R. 258). 
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Plaintiffs' counsel continued to argue that Pro-Benefit was not 
an employer and the effect,of the employee medical benefit plan 
was fraudulent. (R. 259). Counsel argued that plaintiffs 
could bring their common law claims in state court because no 
employer-employee relationship existed between Wolsey and Pro-
Benefit. (R. 260). In summing up her argument, plaintiffs' 
counsel stated: 
The bottom line in this case is there are 
no material issues of fact as to whether 
or not Pro Benefit was an employer. The 
uncontested facts specifically point out 
that they were not an employer. And if 
they were not an employer, then ERISA does 
not apply and we are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. And the judgment as a 
matter of law is that we can bring this 
claim in the state court. (R. 261). 
8. At the hearing before the trial court on June 19, 
1992, counsel for Intercare set forth the position of Intercare 
as follows: 
MR. BURTON: All right. First and 
foremost is as a matter of contract law 
this case needs to be dismissed. Plain-
tiff has filed a suit seeking medical 
benefits under an employee benefit plan 
under the Pro Benefit Employee Benefit 
Plan. Yet he has filed an affidavit 
saying: I'm not an employee of Pro 
Benefit. To that affidavit and to his 
memorandum in opposition to this motion 
he's attached a copy of the plan or the 
agreement under which he seeks benefits. 
And that agreement is very interesting in 
the reading of the agreement. 
The agreement says it's the summary 
plan description for the employee benefit 
plan. And then it says on the initial 
page, "The employer has initiated this 
plan to provide benefits to its employees 
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and their beneficiaries. The plan shall 
be maintained for the exclusive benefit of 
eligible employees and their 
beneficiaries." 
The plan is talking about eligibil-
ity. It says, "The program of benefits is 
provided to all permanent full-time 
employees working an average of 3 0 hours a 
week." In talking about who is eligible 
it says, "You will be covered under the 
plan provided you meet eligibility 
requirements provided below," and lists a 
bunch. And it talks about in terms of: 
An employee is this, an employee is that. 
Then it talks about when coverage 
under this plan — when an employee,s 
entitlement would end. It's called 
"employee termination of coverage." "The 
coverage of any employee shall automati-
cally terminate at midnight at the 
earliest time indicated below." The first 
one is on the date of termination of 
employment. Then it says, "Dependant's 
coverage will cease on the date of the 
termination of the employee's coverage." 
So, your Honor, in light of the 
affidavit that's been filed, Mr. Wolsey is 
taking the position here in this court, in 
sworn affidavit testimony where he says: 
I'm not an employee of Pro Benefit. This 
is the agreement under which he's entitled 
to recover medical benefits, if he's 
entitled to them at all. The agreement 
says it only applies to employees. So as 
a matter of contract law he has no right 
to recover any benefits from anybody if he 
takes the position as he has that he's not 
an employee. So for that reason, certain-
ly it ought to be sufficient for the court 
to throw this case out and grant summary 
judgment. (R. 251-253). 
summing up, counsel for Intercare stated: 
So, your Honor, I think that the easy 
answer to this, is the plaintiff is 
saying: I want benefits under this plan, 
but I'm really not an employee. And then 
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the plan says that if you're not an 
employee you're not entitled to any 
benefits. So he has no case. 
But if he's going to retreat from 
that position then he has to say: Yeah, 
I'm entitled to benefits under that plan, 
and maybe I am an employee under that 
plan. And if he is, then ERISA applies and 
ERISA preemption, and the case should be 
dismissed. In any event, the case should 
be dismissed by this court and Mr. Wolsey 
can look at whatever remedies he has in 
the federal court. 
But I submit if your Honor dismissed 
it on the first ground, that would be a 
dismissal with prejudice and that would be 
a proper thing to do. And I think under 
sworn testimony he's saying: I'm not an 
employee. And the contract says if you're 
not an employee, you've got no coverage. 
(R. 257). 
Since it was Intercare's motion, counsel for Intercare had 
the right to open and conclude the argument. He opened the 
argument asking for a dismissal with prejudice and concluded 
the argument the same way. Counsel stated: 
The case that his [plaintiff's] 
counsel cites are just totally inappli-
cable in this case. Whether he's [T. Mark 
Wolsey] technically a common-law employee 
or whether he isn't is not the issue. The 
issue is what did he represent himself to 
be. He represented himself to be an 
employee so he could get the benefits of 
this plan. If he wants the benefits of the 
plan he better live with whatever draw-
backs there may be to the very plan that 
he premised his right of recovery. 
I submit, your Honor, that he said — 
he's represented to the court, and his 
counsel has represented, that he's not an 
employee. The plan says if you're not, 
you're entitled to no coverage. This 
court should, I submit, simply dismiss the 
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case with prejudice and we'll be done with 
it. (R. 265). 
9. The medical benefit plan which Wolsey attached to his 
affidavit only allows medical benefits to employees and their 
dependents. If a person is not an employee of Pro-Benefit, the 
person is not entitled to any medical benefits. The plan reads 
in pertinent part: 
The employer has initiated this plan to 
provide benefits to its employees and 
their beneficiaries. The Plan shall be 
maintained for the exclusive benefit of 
eligible employees and their benefici-
aries. (R. 153) . 
In defining who was eligible under the plan, the plan states: 
This program of benefits is provided to 
all permanent full-time employees working 
an average of thirty (30) hours or more 
per week. (R. 149). 
The plan then talks about eligibility. The plan specifies 
repeatedly that, "employees will be eligible and employees7 
dependents may be eligible if they meet certain criteria." (R. 
149) . The plan has another heading entitled "Employee 
Termination of Coverage." This portion of the plan specifies: 
The coverage of any employee shall auto-
matically terminate at midnight at the 
earliest time indicated below: 
1. On the date of termination of 
employment; . . . (R. 148-147). 
The plan also has another heading entitled "Dependent Termina-
tion of Coverage." It states: 
Dependents' coverage shall automatically 
cease at midnight at the earliest time 
indicated below: 
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1. On the date of termination of 
employee's coverage. (R. 147). 
10. After argument took place, Judge Christensen took the 
matter under advisement. (R. 200). Later, after considering 
and rejecting plaintiff's objection to the form of the proposed 
judgment because it would have the effect of dismissing the 
case with prejudice (R. 201-204, 211), Judge Christensen 
entered an order dismissing plaintiffs7 amended complaint 
against Intercare with prejudice. (R. 207). 
11. Although plaintiffs' counsel objected to the form of 
the judgment which Judge Christensen signed, on September 9, 
1992, counsel did not object to the fact that no Rule 54(b) 
determination had been made with respect to the judgment. (R. 
204) . 
12. After the September 9, 1992 judgment was entered, 
plaintiffs' counsel then sought to amend the judgment. 
Although plaintiffs argued the judgment should be without 
prejudice, as opposed to with prejudice, they never sought to 
amend the judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and they never asked Judge Christensen to certify 
the judgment as final for purposes of appeal. (R. 219, 222). 
Pro-Benefits Staffing, Inc. 
13. On January 14, 1992, plaintiffs filed a motion to 
amend their complaint to assert claims against Pro-Benefit. 
(R. 23). 
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14. Plaintiffs' motion to amend was granted on February 
11, 1992, and Pro-Benefit was then officially a party to the 
action. (R. 176) . 
15. Although no notice was given to defendant's counsel 
of actions taken by plaintiffs, the record reveals that on 
March 19, 1992, plaintiffs filed an ex parte verified motion 
seeking service by publication on Pro-Benefit. (R. 188) . This 
motion was granted on March 30, 1992. (R. 192). Pro-Benefit 
was subsequently served by mail. (R. 194). 
16. On September 15, 1992, plaintiffs7 counsel filed a 
two-page pleading entitled Precipe Upon Default and Default 
Certificate. Although no notice of this pleading was given to 
Intercare's counsel at the time, the record reflects that Judge 
Christensen signed a default certificate on that same day, 
September 15, 1992. (R. 217, 216). 
17. No judgment or final order of any kind has been 
entered against Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. 
18. On November 10, 1992, an notice of appeal was filed 
from the September 9, 1992 judgment, notwithstanding the fact 
that the judgment did not dispose of all claims against all 
parties, and notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs' claims 
against Pro-Benefit remain pending and unresolved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiffs purport 
to appeal from a nonfinal judgment. The judgment did not 
dispose of all of plaintiffs' claims against all parties. 
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Plaintiffs' claims against co-defendant Pro-Benefit remain 
pending. Plaintiffs never sought a Rule 54(b) determination by 
the trial court which would allow them to properly appeal this 
case. Because the judgment in this case has not been certified 
as final by the trial court, the appeal must be dismissed. 
In the district court plaintiffs opposed defendants 
motion for summary judgment by vigorously arguing that their 
claims were not preempted by ERISA. No other arguments were 
made by plaintiffs in opposition to summary judgment. Now, on 
appeal, plaintiffs reverse themselves and acknowledge that 
their claims are preempted by ERISA. Plaintiffs now advance 
entirely new arguments in,an attempt to overturn the judgment 
of the trial court, all of which are unique to this appeal. 
The Utah appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized that they 
will not consider arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal. The district court's judgment must therefore be 
affirmed. 
Plaintiffs7 complaint is without merit and fails to state 
a cause of action because all of the claims contained in the 
complaint are preempted by ERISA, as plaintiffs have now 
acknowledged. Consequently the trial court had no choice but 
to dismiss plaintiffs7 complaint on the merits with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs claim that once it was determined that ERISA 
preempted the state law claims, the trial court lacked juris-
diction to rule on the merits of the case, and could only 
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This argument is 
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erroneous for two reasons. First, ERISA expressly provides 
that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over disputed 
benefits under an ERISA plan. Second, plaintiffs7 complaint 
does not contain an ERISA claim, but rather contains only state 
law claims over which the district court obviously has juris-
diction. 
Despite being alerted to the fact that their claims were 
preempted by ERISA, plaintiffs nonetheless refused to add an 
ERISA claim to their amended complaint. Instead plaintiffs 
chose to rely exclusively upon common law claims that allowed 
for the recovery of punitive damages. Now that their common 
law claims have been dismissed for lack of merit, plaintiffs 
seek to start over by filing a new complaint in federal court 
based upon ERISA. This is inappropriate. Under the doctrine 
of res judicata, plaintiffs must bring all of their possible 
claims in a single action. Those claims not contained in the 
initial action are forever barred. 
In addition to the foregoing, summary judgment is also 
appropriate in light of the admissions made by plaintiffs. 
Wolsey previously admitted in his sworn affidavit that he was 
not an employee of Pro-Benefit. The employee benefit plan at 
the center of this dispute limits its coverage to individuals 
who are employees. Conseguently plaintiffs' complaint fails to 
state a claim as a matter of law. For this reason plaintiffs 
are now attempting to withdraw their prior admission. The 
doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents plaintiffs from doing 
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so. Summary judgment in favor of Intercare was therefore 
appropriate. 
Plaintiffs7 claims are also barred by the doctrine of 
waiver. Plaintiffs knowingly filed a complaint and an amended 
complaint asserting only state law claims in an effort to 
obtain punitive damages. Plaintiffs refused to assert a claim 
for ERISA, despite being alerted in Intercare's Answer to the 
fact that ERISA preempted all state law claims. By electing to 
only pursue state law claims, plaintiffs waived their right to 
assert a claim under ERISA. In a similar manner, plaintiffs 
have also waived their right to assert that Wolsey is an 
employee of Pro-Benefit. By stating repeatedly that Wolsey was 
not an employee, plaintiffs have waived their right to now 
argue that Wolsey was an employee. 
Despite the fact that plaintiffs' lawsuit was pending 
against defendant Intercare for one year before Judge 
Christensen dismissed the case with prejudice, plaintiffs 
adduced no evidence establishing any liability on behalf of 
Intercare. The affidavit filed by Beardall, President of 
Intercare, was unrefuted. That affidavit clearly establishes 
that Intercare was not an insurer of plaintiffs, entered into 
no contracts with plaintiffs, was not obligated to provide 
benefits to plaintiffs, and simply acted as a claims processor. 
To the extent plaintiffs had viable claims of any kind, those 
claims were against Pro-Benefit, and not against Intercare. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT FROM WHICH PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL 
DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ALL CLAIMS OF ALL PARTIES, IT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINAL JUDGMENT AND THIS COURT 
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW IT. 
Appeals can only be taken from final judgments. See Utah 
R. App. P. 3(a). The judgment in this case was not certified 
as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Although plaintiffs' counsel objected to the initial entry of 
the judgment and then sought to amend or modify the judgment, 
plaintiffs' counsel never suggested to the trial court that the 
judgment should be certified under Rule 54(b). Therefore, the 
judgment is not final and no appeal lies to this court. 
In Crosland v. Peck. 738 P.2d 631 (Utah 1987), plaintiff 
Lawrence Crosland brought a lien foreclosure action against 
defendants Novella Jane Crosland and Gerald and Diann Peck. 
Crosland then moved for summary judgment against Novella and 
the Pecks. The Pecks filed a cross-motion for summary judgment 
against Crosland. The trial court denied Crosland's motion for 
summary judgment, granted the Pecks' motion, and dismissed 
Crosland's complaint on the merits and with prejudice as to the 
Pecks. Crosland then appealed from that order. 
The Supreme Court determined that the appeal was not from 
a final order and therefore dismissed the appeal. The Court 
acknowledged that the trial court's order fully decided issues 
between the Pecks and Crosland, but stated there were still 
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parties and issues before the trial court, and there was no 
Rule 54(b) certification that the judgment appealed from 
constituted a final judgment. The Court stated: 
While the trial court's order may have 
qualified for certification under Rule 
54(b), there was no reason for delay, nor 
was there an express certification in the 
record. Therefore, the order appealed 
from is not a final judgment for purposes 
of appeal. Williams v. State. 716 P.2d 
806 (Utah 1986); All Weather Insulation, 
Inc. v. Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d 
1176 (Utah 1985); Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). No motion 
was made under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure for an interlocutory 
appeal. Therefore, the appeal not being 
properly brought before the court, it is 
ordered dismissed. Id. 
Steck v. Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990), is a 
controlling Utah Supreme Court precedent. The Steck case 
consisted of three wrongful death cases consolidated at the 
district court. Summary judgment was entered at the district 
court level disposing of all claims of Patsy and Wendell 
Heaton, heirs of one of the decedents. The Heatons then 
appealed. The Court noted that all claims they asserted had 
been disposed of, and that in another of the consolidated 
cases, all claims of the heirs of passenger Dr. Richard Chase 
had likewise been concluded by settlement. But the Court noted 
that claims in the third consolidated case brought by other 
heirs remained pending in the district court. The Court 
further observed that the summary judgment appealed from had 
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not been certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(b). 
In dismissing the appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held as 
follows: 
We adopt the rationale of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Huene v. 
United States, 743 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 
1984). In that case, the court said: 
In our view, the best approach is to 
permit the appeal only when there is 
a final judgment that resolves all of 
the consolidated actions unless a 
54(b) certification is entered by the 
district court. This leaves the 
discretion with the court which is 
best able to evaluate the affect 
[sic] of an interim appeal on the 
parties and on the expeditious 
resolution of the entire action. 
743 F.2d at 705. 
Because the judgment appealed does 
not dispose of all claims of all parties 
in the consolidated case, it does not 
constitute a final judgment, and this 
court has no jurisdiction to review it. 
The appeal is therefore dismissed. Id. 
709. 
A number of other Utah cases could be cited, all of which 
stand for the proposition that a judgment such as the one 
rendered in this case is not final for purposes of appeal, and 
the appellate court is therefore obligated to dismiss the 
appeal. See for example, Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 692 
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. 
Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Sneddon v. Graham, 
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821 P.2d 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Bennion v. Pennzoil 
Company. 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, the appeal should be dismissed because the 
trial court did not certify the September 9, 1992 judgment as 
final under Rule 54(b), plaintiffs made no effort to obtain 
such a certification, and the judgment does not dispose of all 
claims against all parties, given the fact that plaintiffs' 
lawsuit against Pro-Benefit remains pending in the trial court. 
POINT II, 
THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BRIEF WERE 
NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
At the trial level, defendant Intercare moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that all of the claims contained in 
plaintiffs7 complaint were preempted by ERISA. Plaintiffs1 
only argument in opposition to defendant's motion was that 
plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by ERISA because Wolsey 
was not an employee of Pro-Benefit. No other arguments were 
made. 
Now, on appeal, plaintiffs are attempting to abandon their+ 
prior argument in favor of new contradictory arguments. In 
their brief plaintiffs "withdraw their objection to ERISA 
preemption of their claim," and then proceed to make new 
arguments that were never raised at the trial level, i.e., 
ERISA does indeed apply, the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion, estoppel is inapplicable. This is inappropriate. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
defenses, claims, and issues not raised at the trial level 
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. See 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983); Pratt v. 
City Council, 639 P.2d 172, 173 (Utah 1981). This general rule 
applies to appeals from lower court rulings on summary judgment 
motions. See e.g., Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 
(Utah 1983); Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214, 215 (Utah 
1981); Cleqg v. Lee. 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348 (1973). 
Plaintiffs "did not . . . raise [their new issues] before the 
trial court and [have] therefore waived any right to present 
them on appeal." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 
800-01 (Utah 1991) . 
The arguments raised in plaintiffs' brief were not 
presented to the trial court. In light of the foregoing 
authorities, plaintiffs' new issues should not be considered 
and this Court should affirm the trial court's award of summary 
judgment to defendant. 
POINT III, 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE WAS PROPER. 
Despite controlling cases which were set forth in 
Intercare's memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiffs nonetheless argued to the trial court that 
ERISA was inapplicable and based their case on common law 
claims. They lost that argument at the trial court and have 
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abandoned that argument on appeal. They are now critical of 
Judge Christensen for dismissing their common law claims with 
prejudice even though that is the only ground upon which they 
pursued the case below. 
Plaintiffs' sole contention on appeal is that the trial 
court should have dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice 
rather than with prejudice even though the claims they made and 
arguments they asserted at the trial court level required the 
judge to do just what he did. Plaintiffs' argument on appeal 
is without merit for a number of reasons, each of which are 
discussed below: 
A. All of Plaintiffs' State Law Claims Were Preempted 
by ERISA and Therefore Dismissal With Prejudice Was 
Required, 
For the first time on appeal, plaintiffs "concede that 
. . . [the] Pro-Benefit . . . employee plan [falls] 
within the bounds of federal ERISA protection." (Plaintiffs7 
Brief, p. 5). Consequently, all of plaintiffs7 state law 
claims are preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1144(a), 
1144(b)(2). See also. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 
41 (1986) ; Carter v. Amax Coal Corp. , 748 F. Supp. 812 (D. Utah 
1990). Plaintiffs now acknowledge this fact. Because plain-
tiff's claims are preempted by ERISA, their complaint fails to 
state a cause of action as a matter of law. The trial court 
therefore had no choice but to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on 
the merits with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice was appro-
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priate because the complaint lacked merit and failed to state 
a claim. 
The foregoing analysis is supported by this Court's recent 
decision in Demond v. FHP, 849 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1993). In 
Demond the plaintiff was insured under an employee welfare 
benefit plan governed by ERISA. When a coverage dispute arose, 
the plaintiff filed suit against the insurer in state court. 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged breach of contract and other 
state law claims, but did not allege any action under ERISA. 
Consequently the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' 
complaint. On appeal this Court affirmed the dismissal, 
stating that: 
We find that in light of all the facts and 
circumstances this insurance program is 
[an] employee welfare benefit plan under 
ERISA and the trial court properly 
dismissed the state common law claims. 
Id. at 73. See also, Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496 
(Utah App. 1992). 
Although the Demond opinion does not specifically state 
that the case was dismissed with prejudice, it is clear that 
the dismissal must have been with prejudice. Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
Unless the court in its order for 
dismissal otherwise specifies, a[n] 
[involuntary] dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
for in this rule, other than a dismissal 
for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
venue or for lack of an indispensable 
party, operates as an adjudication upon 
the merits. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
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As in Demond, plaintiffs' complaint in this case asserts 
only state law claims that are preempted by ERISA. The trial 
court was therefore forced to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on 
the merits because plaintiffs failed to amend the complaint and 
the complaint failed to state a cause of action. This Court 
should affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment, just 
as it did in Demond. 
B* The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Complaint With Prejudice, 
1. The Trial Court Had Concurrent Jurisdiction 
Over ERISA Claims. 
The primary argument raised in plaintiffs' brief is that 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint with prejudice. In their own words, plaintiffs 
allege that, "at the point at which a state court determines 
that ERISA preempts a state claim, that court no longer has 
jurisdiction other than the minimum necessary to direct the 
dismissal of the claim without prejudice." (Plaintiffs' Brief, 
p. 5). This allegation is an incorrect statement of the law 
and, not surprisingly, is unsupported by any authority. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, state courts are not 
deprived of jurisdiction the moment it is determined that ERISA 
preempts a state claim. Indeed, ERISA itself provides that 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over these types of 
ERISA cases: 
25 
(a) A civil action may be brought — 
(1) By a participant or beneficiary 
* * * 
(B) to recover benefits 
due to him under the terms of his 
plan, to enforce his rights under the 
terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan. . . . 
* * * 
(e)(1) except for actions under sub-
section (a)(1)(B) of this section [quoted 
above], the district courts of the United 
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
of civil actions under this subchapter 
brought by the Secretary or by a partici-
pant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. State 
courts of competent jurisdiction and 
district courts of the United States shall 
have concurrent jurisdiction of actions 
under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this 
section. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs' complaint seeks benefits allegedly due to them 
under the terms of an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. 
Consequently, under the statute quoted above, the state court 
had concurrent jurisdiction and was fully capable of dismissing 
plaintiffs' claims on the merits. See, e.g., White v. Enron 
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Imler v. Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co.. 650 P.2d 712, 714 (Kan. App. 1982). The trial 
court was not deprived of jurisdiction the moment it determined 
that the employee benefit plan was governed by ERISA, as 
alleged by plaintiffs. 
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Despite plaintiffs' suggestions to the contrary, concur-
rent state court jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the 
federal government's goal of applying federal law in a uniform 
manner: 
Congress' enforcement scheme vests juris-
diction over most types of ERISA civil 
actions exclusively in the federal courts. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits or 
enforce rights under a plan, however, is 
vested concurrently in state and federal 
courts. Congress' choice to vest juris-
diction over one class of ERISA civil 
actions in both the state and federal 
courts is in no way inconsistent with its 
intent to create a comprehensive scheme of 
federal common law in the area. State as 
well as federal courts may be dispositors 
of federal law. Moreover, Congress' 
choice to grant the state courts concur-
rent jurisdiction over this particular 
class of cases squares with its overall 
legislative goals. Actions to recover 
benefits or enforce rights under the terms 
of a plan will typically involve the 
application of those general principles of 
contract law with which the state courts 
have had substantial experience before 
ERISA; their expertise qualifies them to 
evaluate these rules in the light of 
ERISA's policies and apply federal common 
law. Congress simply increased the number 
of forums to which a claimant might have 
access in these cases, presumably both to 
increase the claimant's options and also 
to mitigate to some degree the burden on 
the federal courts resulting from ERISA. 
Either party, of course, retains the right 
of access to a federal forum in actions 
ERISA governs irrespective of diversity of 
citizenship or amount in controversy, 
plaintiff by filing there, and defendant 
by removing. Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co.. 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 n. 2 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted; emphasis 
added). 
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2. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction Because 
Plaintiffs Asserted Only State Law Claims. Res 
Judicata Prohibits Plaintiffs From Asserting a 
New Claim Under ERISA. 
In addition to the foregoing, there exists a more funda-
mental and compelling reason to reject plaintiffs7 argument 
that the state court had no jurisdiction to dismiss ERISA 
claims with prejudice. Neither plaintiffs' complaint nor their 
amended complaint contain an ERISA claim; instead these 
complaints contain only common law causes of action. Certainly 
the trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss plaintiffs' state 
law claims on the merits. ERISA is not involved because it was 
not alleged by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' failure to assert a claim under ERISA was not 
simply oversight, but was rather a calculated decision to 
pursue only those theories that allow recovery of punitive 
damages. Punitive damages are not available under ERISA. See 
e.g. , O'Neil v. Gen Corp. , Inc. , 764 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. N.Y. 
1991); Browning v. Grote Meat Co., 703 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Mo. 
1988). In its answer defendant alerted plaintiffs to the fact 
that plaintiffs' claims were preempted by ERISA. (R. 18, 
Fourth Defense). However, plaintiffs chose not to assert an 
ERISA claim. Indeed, only a few months later plaintiffs 
amended their complaint to assert additional common law 
theories. Plaintiffs did not add an ERISA claim to their 
amended complaint. 
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Shortly after plaintiffs filed their proposed amended 
complaint, defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
of ERISA preemption. In its supporting memorandum filed 
January 22, 1992, defendant again informed plaintiffs that 
their common law causes of action were all preempted by ERISA. 
Nonetheless, plaintiffs again elected to forego asserting an 
ERISA claim and instead tried to preserve their claim tc 
punitive damages by arguing that their common law claims were 
not preempted by ERISA. Oral argument on the motion for 
summary judgment did not take place until June 19, 1992. By 
that time, plaintiffs still had made no attempt to assert ERISA 
claims. At no time after the motion for summary judgment was 
argued did plaintiffs seek to add an ERISA claim. When 
plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal, they still had not 
asserted any ERISA claims. In short, despite numerous oppor-
tunities to do so, plaintiffs never asserted any ERISA claims 
at the trial court level. 
After pursuing their punitive damage and common law claims 
as far as the law would allow, plaintiffs now wish to back up 
and start over by filing a new complaint in federal court 
relying solely upon ERISA. This is entirely inappropriate. 
The doctrine of res judicata requires a litigant to consolidate 
all claims arising from a single transaction or occurrence into 
a single action. A plaintiff cannot file a separate complaint 
for each cause of action he wishes to assert. See e.g.
 f 
Christian v. American Home Assurance Co. , 577 P.2d 899, 905 
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(Okla. 1977); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559 
P.2d 411, 413 (N.M. 1977). The rule provides that all remedies 
available to a plaintiff must be pursued in one action and "all 
claims that could have been brought in the first action merge 
in the judgment, regardless of whether the plaintiff actually 
asserted those claims." Wilson v. Western Alliance Corp.. 715 
P.2d 1344, 1345 (Or. App. 1986). See also. Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Cream, Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983), Belliston 
v. Texaco. Inc., 521 P.2d 379, 380 (Utah 1974); Wheadon v. 
Pearson. 376 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Utah 1962); Allen v. McCurrv. 
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The effect of this rule is to preclude 
parties from spreading their demands and prosecuting their 
claims piecemeal, leaving portions to be presented in 
subsequent suits if the first suit fails. See Leonard Farms. 
559 P.2d at 413. 
The test for res judicata is found in Fitzgerald v. 
Corbett, 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1990): 
In order for a claim to be barred by res 
judicata, the current claim and a prior 
claim must satisfy three elements: (1) 
both cases must involve the same parties, 
their privies or assignees; (2) the claim 
that is asserted to be barred must have 
been presented or be such that it could 
have been presented in the first case; and 
(3) the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. Id. at 359 
(emphasis added). 
In the event that plaintiffs were to file a new complaint 
under ERISA, all three elements of the res judicata test would 
be satisfied. First, the complaint would involve the same 
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parties. Second, the claim would involve an action under 
ERISA, which could have (and should have) been presented in 
this case. Third, this case resulted in a final judgment 
dismissing plaintiffs/ common law causes of action on the 
merits because they were all preempted by federal law. 
In light of the foregoing authorities, it is evident that 
plaintiffs cannot file a new complaint asserting a claim under 
ERISA. Plaintiffs are similarly unable to amend their 
complaint after a final dismissal. See Nichols v. State, 554 
P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1976); Steiner v. State, 495 P.2d 809, 810-
11 (Utah 1972) . Plaintiffs lost their right to assert an ERISA 
claim when they made a calculated decision to pursue only state 
law causes of action in the hopes of obtaining punitive 
damages. Plaintiffs cannot pursue punitive damage theories and 
then, when the theories fail, start over and pursue other 
claims. This Court should affirm the award of summary judgment 
to Intercare. 
C. summary Judgment Was Also Appropriate Based Upon the 
Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel. 
Even if plaintiffs had decided to assert an ERISA claim in 
their complaint, and even if, as plaintiffs allege, the state 
district court was deprived of jurisdiction to dismiss the 
ERISA claim with prejudice, Intercare would nonetheless have 
been entitled to summary judgment. 
At the trial level, Intercare's motion for summary judg-
ment alleged that plaintiffs' claims failed to state a cause of 
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action because they were preempted by ERISA. In response 
plaintiffs argued exclusively that ERISA did not apply because 
Wolsey was not an employee of Pro-Benefit. Plaintiffs 
submitted an affidavit from Wolsey affirmatively alleging that 
Wolsey was not an employee. Plaintiffs' opposing memorandum 
emphasized over and over again that Wolsey was not an employee 
of Pro-Benefit. 
In light of Wolsey's admission that he was not employed by 
Pro-Benefit, Intercare's reply memorandum pointed out that 
Intercare was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
because the medical benefits plan upon which all claims had to 
be based only provided coverage for employees. More specifi-
cally, the summary plan description provides that, "This 
program of benefits is provided to all permanent full-time 
employees working an average of thirty (3 0) hours or more per 
week." (R. 149). Based upon plaintiffs' repeated admissions 
that Wolsey was not an employee of Pro-Benefit, the trial court 
properly concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to 
coverage under the employee benefit plan and dismissed plain-
tiffs' complaint on the merits. 
On appeal plaintiffs are now attempting to "withdraw" 
their admission that Wolsey is not a Pro-Benefit employee. Now 
plaintiffs argue that their common law claims are preempted by 
ERISA and that Wolsey jls a Pro-Benefit employee. These argu-
ments directly contradict the arguments made by plaintiffs 
before the trial court. 
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Plaintiffs are estopped from contradicting their prior 
sworn statement that Wolsey is not an employee of Pro-Benefit, 
This court recently stated that parties are prohibited from 
engaging in the type of legal gamesmanship employed by plain-
tiffs in this case: 
Generally in legal proceedings a party 
with knowledge of all the facts will not 
be allowed to take a position, pursue that 
position to fruition, and later, with no 
substantial change in circumstances, 
return to attack the validity of the prior 
position or the outcome flowing from it. 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 
(Utah App. 1990). See also, Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 601 P.2d 
589, 592 (Ariz. 1979) (estoppel prevents a party from taking an 
inconsistent position in a subsequent judicial proceeding); 
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980) (a person 
taking a position in prior litigation and obtaining relief on 
the basis of it cannot maintain an opposite position in a 
subsequent action); Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 664 P. 2d 
745, 751-52 (Hawaii App. 1983) (judicial estoppel prevents a 
party from taking inconsistent positions during the course of 
a judicial proceeding); Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co.. 829 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah App. 1992) (insured's claim 
that an issue of fact existed precluded a later argument that 
a subrogation claim was not fairly debatable and made in bad 
faith); Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 497 P.2d 629 (Utah 1972) 
(plaintiff could not assert that condemnation action was still 
pending after previously asserting that the action was over). 
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The doctrine of judicial estoppel is intended to prevent 
a party from "playing fast and loose" with the court. Citizens 
Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co. , Inc. . 552 P.2d 796, 802 
(N.M. App. 1976); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 
1976). The doctrine obviously applies in the instant case, 
where Wolsey alleged first that he was not an employee of Pro-
Benefit, but now asserts that he is. An identical attempt was 
made and rejected in Rowland v. Klies. 726 P. 2d 310 (Mont. 
1986). 
In Rowland, the plaintiff contracted to watch the defen-
dants properties in exchange for being allowed to live in one 
of the defendants cabins. The defendant later forced the 
plaintiff to vacate the cabin and the plaintiff sued. The 
plaintiff's original complaint asserted many causes of action 
and the defendant moved for partial summary judgment on some of 
the claims. In opposition to the defendant's motion, the 
plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit stating that he was not 
employed by the defendant. After the motion was resolved the 
plaintiff amended his complaint to assert a claim for breach of 
employment contract and also a statutory claim for employer 
deception. Defendant then moved for summary judgment on these 
claims on the grounds that the plaintiff was not an employee of 
the defendant, as previously sworn by plaintiff in his own 
affidavit. The plaintiff opposed this motion by stating that 
he was an employee. The trial court granted summary judgment 
and the plaintiff appealed. 
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On appeal the Montana Supreme Court upheld the award of 
summary judgment to the defendant. In doing so, the court 
stated that: 
[A]fter appellant had filed his first 
complaint but prior to the filing of the 
amended complaint, appellant filed a sworn 
affidavit with the Jefferson County 
District Court clerk of court. In that 
affidavit, appellant swears that he was 
not "employed" by respondent; that the use 
of the word "hired" in his complaint was 
not intended to be defined as hired in the 
sense of an employer-employee relation-
ship; that he was not hired as an employer 
hires an employee. . . . The district 
court, in considering this affidavit, 
stated that it "seems to me to work a 
fraud upon the court for plaintiff to now 
claim damages from any sort of employment 
status." We also question the propriety 
of allowing appellant to now assert that 
there was an employment relationship. 
The rule is well established that 
during the course of litigation a party is 
not permitted to assume or occupy incon-
sistent and contradictory positions, and 
while this rule is frequently referred to 
as "judicial estoppel," it more properly 
is a rule which estops a party to play 
fast and loose with the courts. 
Although the rule may be regarded as 
a form of estoppel, it is not strictly one 
of estoppel, but partakes rather of 
positive rules and procedure based on 
manifest justice and, to a greater or 
lesser degree, on considerations of the 
orderliness, regularity, and expedition of 
litigation. 
Those elements such as reliance and 
injury, or prejudice to the individual, 
which are generally essential to the 
operation of equitable estoppel, may not 
enter into judicial estoppel, at least not 
to the same extent. In order to work a 
judicial estoppel, the position first 
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assumed must have been taken knowingly and 
free of inducement by the opposite party. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel 
applies with particular force to admis-
sions or statements made under sanction of 
oath. 
* * * 
fP"|arties are bound by and estopped to 
controvert admissions in their pleadings. 
We find no reason why this rule should not 
be extended, at least in the peculiar 
context of this case, to estop a party 
from controverting admissions in his 
affidavit. Especially where it appears 
that appellant is shifting his position on 
the issue of an employment relationship 
simply to suit his legal maneuvering at 
the time. . . . 
We hold that appellant is estopped 
from asserting that an employment relation-
ship existed and summary judgment on the 
first two claims for relief was 
appropriate. 
Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added, citations and quotations 
omitted). 
A similar result was reached in Harris v. Bailey, 798 P. 2d 
96 (Mont. 1990). In Harris, the plaintiff had previously 
asserted that he was a tenured teacher. Later, the plaintiff 
argued that he was not a teacher under a particular state 
statute. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to change 
his position and found for the defendant. 
Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming that Wolsey was 
employed by Pro-Benefit. In light of Wolsey's admission that 
he was not Pro-Benefit's employee, this court should affirm the 
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice because only 
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employees are entitled to benefits under the employee benefit 
plan at the heart of this dispute. 
Plaintiffs discount their own admission and argue that 
there is a factual dispute over whether Wolsey was an employee 
of Pro-Benefit. Plaintiffs point to the affidavit of Beardall, 
which states that Wolsey was employed by Pro-Benefit. However, 
Beardall's statement is based solely upon the documents 
provided to him by Pro-Benefit, which identify Wolsey as an 
employee. Beardall does not have personal knowledge of the 
relationship between Pro-Benefit and Wolsey and is therefore 
unable to refute Wolsey's assertion that he is not an employee, 
which assertion is based on personal knowledge. Plaintiffs 
recognized this fact and, during oral argument before the trial 
court, moved for summary judgment arguing that as a matter of 
law, Wolsey was not an employee of Pro-Benefit. (R. 258-261). 
Plaintiffs cannot now reverse their position and rely on 
Beardall's affidavit to create an issue of fact on the 
employment status of Wolsey. 
Even if plaintiffs could create an issue of fact over 
Wolsey's employment status, defendant would still have been 
entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint 
with prejudice. Wolsey's employment status does not change the 
outcome of this case. On the one hand, assuming that Wolsey 
was a Pro-Benefit employee as is now alleged, ERISA would be 
applicable to this case and would preempt all of the claims 
asserted in plaintiffs' complaint. Since plaintiffs had ample 
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time and opportunity to assert ERISA claims at the trial level 
but chose not to do so, the dismissal with prejudice was 
clearly proper. On the other hand, assuming that Wolsey was 
not a Pro-Benefit employee as originally alleged, plaintiffs 
would be excluded from benefits under the employee benefit plan 
because Wolsey was not employed by Pro-Benefit. Under either 
scenario, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to 
Intercare by dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should not have 
decided whether plaintiffs were entitled to benefits under the 
benefit plan because the issue was not raised until Intercare 
filed its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment. 
This argument lacks merit. Plaintiffs opened the door to this 
argument when they asserted repeatedly and exhaustively in 
their opposing memorandum, that Wolsey was not an employee of 
Pro-Benefit. Intercare was certainly entitled to show that, 
even if plaintiffs' assertion was true, defendant was 
nonetheless entitled to summary judgment. This is the exact 
purpose for a reply memorandum. If plaintiffs felt that they 
had grounds to refute Intercare's reply memorandum, they could 
have done so by requesting permission to file a supplemental 
memorandum or by pleading their case at oral argument. 
However, plaintiffs did not request permission to file a 
supplemental memorandum and, at oral argument, were unable to 
suggest a single reason why they should prevail on their common 
law claims. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the issues 
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presented in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment were all 
properly before and properly decided by the district court, 
D. Plaintiffs' Claimed is Barred by the Doctrine of 
Waiver. 
Plaintiffs' claims are also barred by the doctrine of 
waiver. "Waiver exists where a party has a right, knows of 
that right, and through its objective conduct evidences an 
intent to waive that right regardless of some privately-held 
intention to the contrary." Vali Convalescent & Care 
Institutions v. Div. of Healthcare Financing, 797 P.2d 438 
(Utah App. 1990) (emphasis removed, citation omitted). 
In the instant case plaintiffs were alerted to the fact 
that ERISA preempted all of their state law claims. Nonethe-
less plaintiffs made a calculated decision to proceed with 
their state law claims in the hopes of recovering punitive 
damages. By making this decision plaintiffs have waived their 
right to assert a claim under ERISA. 
In a similar manner plaintiffs have also waived their 
right to argue that Mark Wolsey was employed by Pro-Benefit. 
Plaintiffs initially alleged that Wolsey was not employed by 
Pro-Benefit in order to proceed with their state law claims. 
Plaintiffs knew that, by making this argument, they would lose 
whatever rights they had to recover under ERISA. Nonetheless 
plaintiffs proceeded with their argument in an effort to 
recover punitive damages. By so proceeding plaintiffs have 
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waived their right to now argue that Wolsey was an employee 
under an ERISA plan. 
E. No Disputed Issues of Material Fact Exist, 
There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the 
liability of Intercare. Evidence set forth in the affidavit of 
Beardall was unrefuted despite the fact that judgment dismis-
sing plaintiffs' claims against Intercare was not rendered 
until one year after plaintiffs filed their complaint. In his 
affidavit, Beardall clearly states that Intercare is not an 
insurance company, it never issued any kind of insurance policy 
to plaintiffs, and it never entered into any contract with 
plaintiffs. The affidavit establishes that Intercare was 
simply acting as a contract claims processor for Pro-Benefit's 
employee medical benefit plan, but that Pro-Benefit was the 
administrator of the plan and any monies paid would be paid 
pursuant to the self-insured plan. 
The summary plan description attached to Wolsey7s own 
affidavit establishes that the Pro-Benefit employee benefit 
plan is a self-funded plan (R. 152), it establishes that the 
plan administrator is Pro-Benefit and that the excess insurance 
carrier is Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. (R. 113). It 
states that the plan is administered by the plan administrator, 
and that Intercare is merely a claims processor. (R. 112) . 
The claims processing service agreement attached to the 
affidavit of Beardall likewise establishes that the role 
Intercare assumed was to prepare paperwork and process claims. 
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The plan sponsor was defined as Pro-Benefit. (R. 104) . 
Intercare was not given any discretionary authority or control 
respecting the management of trust funds. (R. 103). Intercare 
assumed no responsibility, risk, liability, or obligation for 
the funding of the medical benefit plan. (R. 102). 
At oral argument on Intercare's motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiffs7 counsel did not dispute the above points. 
In fact, when the court asked plaintiffs' counsel how Intercare 
was involved, plaintiffs' counsel responded, "As outlined in my 
memo we don't know the true relationship of this and discovery 
is continuing. We would allege at this time they're part of 
the insurance company. We need discovery on that." (R. 260). 
The district court was still troubled by what evidence 
plaintiff had implicating Intercare, and therefore later in 
argument posed the following question to plaintiffs' counsel, 
"Well, I'm trying to understand how you get to Intercare 
benefits." Counsel responded, "That's what we have to continue 
to discover is that they are claiming they acted as an adminis-
trative agency. We have yet to have facts as to exactly what 
their role was." (R. 262). 
There are no facts which would validate plaintiffs' theory 
of recovery against Intercare. In the year the case was 
pending before judgment was entered, plaintiffs presented 
nothing to the court on this point. In addition to the other 
reasons cited, the trial court's judgment can certainly be 
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affirmed on the basis that no genuine issues of material fact 
existed as to Intercare's liability• 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be summarily dismissed because jurisdic-
tion in this court is lacking and because plaintiffs' brief 
raises new issues on appeal. 
If the case is decided on the merits, summary judgment 
entered by Judge Cullen Christensen should be affirmed• All of 
the claims contained in plaintiffs' complaint are preempted by 
ERISA. The court had jurisdiction to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint with prejudice and res judicata prevents plaintiffs' 
from commencing a new action against Intercare. Plaintiffs' 
claims are also barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel 
and waiver. 
Additionally, Judge Christensen's summary judgment was 
proper because plaintiffs proffered no evidence suggesting that 
Intercare should be found liable to plaintiffs. 
Intercare therefore urges the Court to affirm summary 
judgment in its favor. 
Dated this J day of June, 1993. 
STRONG & HANNI 
•> (kMh— 
David R. Nielson 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellee 
42 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, this 1st day of June, 1993, to the following: 
Jackson Howard 
Fred D. Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
43 
Rule 2 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 2. Suspension of rules. 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own 
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of 
Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or provisions of 
any of these rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case 
in accordance with its direction. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is court. If the motions are not filed in a timely 
added to the list of those rules that the appel- manner, the appellant may not take advantage 
late court may not suspend. The former list of of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the dispo-
rules that the appellate court could not sus- sition of the motion to file the appeal. Both 
pend concerned procedures and time limits appellate courts treat the failure to file post-
that confer jurisdiction upon the court. Under judgment motions in a timely manner as a ju-
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed risdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652 
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Timely filing. sion of the time limitation contained in Rule 
When a motion for summary disposition was 10, Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams. 798 P.2d 
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen- 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of pa r t i e s . The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
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(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together 
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the 
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed 
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identi-
fied as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The designa-
tion of parties is changed to conform to the des-
ignation of parties in the federal appellate 
courts 
The rule is amended to make clear tha t the 
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-ap-
peal" does not eliminate liability for payment 
of the filing and docketing fees But for the 
order of filing, the cross-appellant would have 
been the appellant and so should be required to 
pay the established fees 
Cros9-References. — Circuit courts, ap-
peals from, § 78-4-11. 
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120. 
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of record 
Attorney fees 
Denial of intervention 
Dismissal by trial court 
Filing fees 
Filing of notice 
Final order or judgment 
Judgment nunc pro tunc 
Motion to strike 
New trial 
Partial judgment 
Postjudgment orders 
Purpose of notice 
Review in equity cases 
Summary judgment 
Unsigned minute entry 
Cited 
Absence of record. 
There was nothing for the court to review 
where the alleged error was not made part of 
the record Powers v Gene's Bldg Materials, 
Inc , 567 P 2d 174 (Utah 1977). 
Attorney fees. 
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees 
by law, he was entitled to attorney fees in-
curred on appeal in defending his judgment 
without the necessity of having to file a cross 
appeal Coates v American Economy Ins Co , 
627 P 2d 92 (Utah 1981), Walhs v Thomas, 
632 P 2 d 39 (Utah 1981) 
Denial of intervention. 
Order denying with prejudice an application 
for intervention was appealable Tracy v Uni-
versity of Utah Hosp , 619 P 2d 340 (Utah 
1980) 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on 
the merits of the issues under Rule 4Kb), 
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eree's order to participate in appeal secured by specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
Power of successor or substituted master or ^ ^ a r e " e x c e P t i o n a l conditions" justifying 
rower ot successor or substituted master or
 r e f e r e n c e u n d e r R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c edure 53(b), 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on I A T P Yed 922 
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
 R e y ^umb^a*. — Equity •» 393 to 395, 401, 
1 0 7 9
- 404 to 406; Reference «=» 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99 
Referee's failure to file report within time et seq. 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
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whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, 
now, Rule 34(d), UtahR.App.P. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs. 
—In general. 
—Challenge of award. 
—Depositions. 
—Discretionary, 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
—Failure to object. 
—Liability of state. 
—Service on adverse party. 
—Statutory limits. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
—Appealability. 
—Attorney's fee award. 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
tion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b). 
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
S 49-6-301. 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule 
62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8. 
—Claims for relief. 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
—Review of finality. 
—Separate claim. 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Interest on judgment. 
Judgment based on unpleaded theory. 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Pleading in the alternative. 
Presumption of finality. 
Real party in interest. 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Specific performance request. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Cited. 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Note 4 
employee and employer over profit sharing Knollmeyer v. Rudco Industries, Inc., 1977, 
plan, enforcement of the provisions of the 381 A.2d 378, 154 N.J.Super. 309. 
plan could not be barred by this chapter. 
Part 5—Administration and Enforcement 
§ 1 1 3 1 . Criminal penalties 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of part 1 of this subtitle, 
or any regulation or order issued under any such provision, shall upon 
conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both; except that in the case of such violation by a person not an 
individual, the fine imposed upon such person shall be a fine not exceeding 
$100,000. 
(Pub.L. 93-406, Title I, § 501, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 891.) 
Historical Note 
Promulgation of Regulations. Secretary Legislative History. For legislative history 
authorised, effective Sept. 2, 1974, to promul- and purpose of Pub.L. 93-406, see 1974 U.S. 
gate regulations wherever provisions of this Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 4639. 
subchapter call for the promulgation of regu-
lations, see section 1031 of this title. 
Cross References 
ReliajT-^ on administrative interpretations as defense to prosecutions under this section, see 
section 1028 of this title. 
West's Federal Forms 
Sentence and fme, see § 7531 et seq. 
§ 1132 . Civil enforcement 
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action 
A civil action may be brought— 
(1) by a participant or beneficiary— 
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or 
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, 
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; 
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for 
appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title; 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of 
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress 
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan; 
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropri-
ate relief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title; .rPp^r< ^ 
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(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by 
the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate eq-
uitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision 
of this subchapter; or 
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i) 
of this section. 
(b) Plans qualified under Internal Revenue Code; maintenance of actions 
involving delinquent contributions 
(1) In the case of a plan which is qualified under section 401(a), 403(a), 
or 405(a) of Title 26 (or with respect to which an application to so qualify 
has been filed and has not been finally determined) the Secretary may 
exercise his authority under subsection (a)(5) of this section with respct l to 
a violation of, or the enforcement of, parts 2 and 3 of this subtitle (relating 
to participation, vesting, and funding), only if— 
(A) requested by the Secretary of the Treasury, or 
(B) one or more participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries, of such 
plan request in writing (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe 
by regulation) that he exercise such authority on their behalf. In the 
case of such a request under this paragraph he may exercise such 
authority only if he determines that such violation affects, or such 
enforcement is necessary to protect, claims of participants or benefi-
ciaries to benefits under the plan. 
(2) The Secretary shall not initiate an action to enforce section 1145 of 
this title. 
(c) Administrator's refusal to supply requested information 
Any administrator who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any 
information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to 
furnish to a participant or beneficiary (unless such failure or refusal results 
from matters reasonably beyond the control of the administrator) by mailing 
the material requested to the last known address of the requesting partici-
pant or beneficiary within 30 days after such request may in the court's 
discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary in the 
amount of up to $100 a day from the date of such failure or refusal, and the 
court may in its discretion order such other relief as it deems proper. 
(d) Status of employee benefit plan as entity 
(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this subchapter as 
an entity. Service of summons, subpena, or other legal process of a court 
upon a trustee or an administrator of an employee benefit plan in his 
capacity as such shall constitute service upon the employee benefit plan. In 
a case where a plan has not designated in the summary plan description of 
the plan an individual as agent for the service of legal process, service upon 
the Secretary shall constitute such service. The Secretary, not later than 15 
days after receipt of service under the preceding sentence, shall notify the 
administrator or any trustee of the plan of receipt of such service. 
(2) Any money judgment under this subchapter against an employee 
benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall 
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not be enforceable against any other person unless liability against such 
person is established in his individual capacity under this subchapter 
(e) Jurisdiction 
(1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the 
district courts of the United States shall have exclusive junsdiction of civil 
actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary State courts of competent jurisdiction and district 
courts of the United States shall have concurrent junsdiction of actions 
under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section 
(2) Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court of 
the United States, it may be brought in the district where the plan is 
administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or 
may be found, and process may be served in any other district where a 
defendant resides or may be found 
(f) Amount in controversy; citizenship of parties 
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, without 
respect to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to 
grant the relief provided for in subsection (a) of this section in any action 
(g) Attorney's fees and costs; awards in actions involving 
delinquent contributions 
(1) In any action under this subchapter (other than an action described in 
paragraph (2)) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its 
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either 
party 
(2) In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary for or on behalf of 
a plan to enforce section 1145 of this title in which a judgment in favor of 
the plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan— 
(A) the unpaid contributions, 
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions, 
(C) an amount equal to the greater of— 
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or 
(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an 
amount not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as 
may be permitted under Federal or State law) of the amount 
determined by the court under subparagraph (A), 
(D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to be paid by 
the defendant, and 
(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropn-
ate 
For purposes of this paragraph, interest on unpaid contributions shall be 
determined by using the rate provided under the plan, or, if none, the rate 
prescnbed under section 6621 of Title 26 
(h) Service upon Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Treasury 
A copy of the complaint in any action under this subchapter by a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (other than an action brought by one or 
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more participants or beneficiaries under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section 
which is solely for the purpose of recovering benefits due such participants 
under the terms of the plan) shall be served upon the Secretary and the 
Secretary of the Treasury by certified mail. Either Secretary shall have the 
right in his discretion to intervene in any action, except that the Secretary of 
the Treasury may not intervene in any action under part 4 of this subtitle. 
If the Secretary brings an action under subsection (a) of this section on 
behalf of a participant or beneficiary, he shall notify the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
(i) Administrative assessment of civil penalty 
In the case of a transaction prohibited by section 1106 of this title by a 
party in interest with respect to a plan to which this part applies, the 
Secretary may assess a civil penalty against such party in interest. The 
amount of such penalty may not exceed 5 percent of the amount involved 
(as defined in section 4975(f)(4) of Title 26); except that if the transaction is 
not corrected (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe by regulation, 
which regulations shall be consistent with section 4975(f)(5) of Title 26) 
within 90 days after notice from the Secretary (or such longer period as the 
Secretary may permit), such penalty may be in an amount not more than 
100 percent of the amount involved. This subsection shall not apply to a 
transaction with respect to a plan described in section 4975(e)(1) of Title 26. 
(j) Direction and control of litigation by Attorney General 
In all civil actions under this subchapter, attorneys appointed by the 
Secretary may represent the Secretary (except as provided in section 518(a) 
of Title 28), but all such litigation shall be subject to the direction and 
control of the Attorney General. 
(k) Jurisdiction of actions against the Secretary of Labor 
Suits by an administrator, fiduciary, participant, or beneficiary of an 
employee benefit plan to review a final order of the Secretary, to restrain the 
Secretary from taking any action contrary to the provisions of this chapter, 
or to compel him to take action required under this subchapter, may be 
brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the 
plan has its principal office, or in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. 
(Pub.L. 93-406, Title I, § 502, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 891; Pub.L. 96-364, Title III, 
§ 306(b), Sept. 26, 1980, 94 Stat. 1295.) 
1
 So in original. Probably should be "respect". 
Historical Note 
References in Text. This subchapter, re-
ferred to in subsecs. (a)(3), (5), (c) to (e), (g), 
(h), (j)» and (k), was in the original "this 
title", meaning Title I of Pub.L. 93-406, 
which enacted this subchapter and amended 
section 5108 of Title 5, Government Orga-
nization and Employees, and sections 664, 
1027 and 1954 of Title 18, Crimes and Crimi-
nal Procedure. For complete classification of 
Title I of Pub.L. 93-406, see Tables volume. 
This chapter, referred to in subsec. (k), was 
in the original "this Act", meaning Pub.L. 
93-406, known as the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974. Titles I, III, 
and IV of such Act are classified principally 
to this chapter. For complete classification 
of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note 
set out under section 1001 of this title and 
Tables volume. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
T. MARK WOLSEY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, et al 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 910400630 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on 
the motion of Def Intercare Benefit Systems seeking Summary 
Judgment. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon 
being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Said motion is granted. 
If, as PI contends in his affidavit, he has never 
been an employee of Def Pro-Benefit, PI would not be entitled to 
benefits as a matter of contract. Under such circumstances, PI 
would certainly have been a party to a sham or fraud which should 
preclude any recovery. 
If the documents upon which PI bases his claims are 
accurate, then PI was in fact an employee of Pro-Benefit and Pi's 
claims are preempted by ERISA rules and regulations. 
Dated this */ day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Danielle Ferron, Esq. 
Jackson B. Howard, Esq, 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Wesley C. Argyle, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Robert A. Burton, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
and 
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3017 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA 
WOLSEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 910400630 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
Defendant Intercare Benefit Systemsf motion for summary 
judgment came on for hearing before the court on June 19, 1992, 
at 11:00 A.M. Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys, 
Jackson B. Howard and Danielle Ferron. Defendant Intercare 
Benefit Systems was represented by its attorneys, Robert A. 
Burton and Wesley C. Argyle. The court having reviewed the 
filef considered memoranda of counsel, entertained argument 
of counsel, and being fully advised, grants defendant 
Intercare Benefit Systems1 motion and finds as follows: 
If, as plaintiff contends in his affidavit, he has 
never been an employee of defendant Pro-Benefit, plaintiff 
would not be entitled to benefits as a matter of contract. 
Under such circumstances, plaintiff would certainly have been a 
party to a sham or fraud which would preclude any recovery. 
If the documents upon which plaintiff bases his claim 
are accurate, then plaintiff was in fact an employee of Pro-
Benefit and plaintiff's claims are preempted by ERISA rules and 
regulations. 
Based upon the foregoing findings and in light of sworn 
testimony given by plaintiff in his affidavit, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's amended complaint against Intercare 
Benefit Systems be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems be and hereby 
is awarded judgment in its favor and against plaintiff, T. Mark 
Wolsey, no cause of action. 
Dated this tf day of ^ ^ J ^ J ^ , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August, 1992, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, 
first-class postage affixed, to: 
Jackson Howard 
Danielle M. Ferron 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 300 North Street 
P. O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
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